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Abstract
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller
needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With inde-
pendent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be reduced
to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs.
Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants,
longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.
1 Introduction
Almost all the auction literature assumes that the set of bidders is either exogenous or determined
in advance before the auction begins. However, auctions based on this assumption are in general
suboptimal if the seller incurs costs when contacting prospective bidders. In this paper we study
profit maximizing auctions in the presence of these costs. We characterize the order in which
bidders are approached, and study the inefficiencies that arise due to the sequential nature of the
process and due to the bidders’ private information about their values.
We consider a seller of a single indivisible good who faces a finite set of bidders. The
bidders’ types are independently drawn, with ex post valuations interdependent across bidders as
in Myerson [11].1 Initially, prospective bidders are not even aware of the seller’s intention to sell
the good. To attract their attention and allow them to participate, the seller must contact them and
provide them with all the necessary information—in Section 2 we discuss several interpretations
of this assumption. After being contacted by the seller and informed about the good for sale,
each bidder privately learns his type before deciding whether or not to participate in the seller’s
mechanism. Given that contacting prospective bidders is costly, it is generally not optimal to
contact all bidders at once. For instance, if the expected valuation of an early bidder turns out to
be sufficiently high, it is best to end the mechanism immediately and sell him the good without
incuring further costs. Hence the seller designs a search mechanism that, contingent on history,
specifies the order in which prospective bidders are contacted, the time at which the process ends,
and the payments made by the participating bidders.
In Section 2, we introduce the model and notations for search mechanisms. In Section 3.1,
we prove one of the main results, Theorem 1: the seller’s problem can be reduced to a standard
search problem in which the payoff from search is measured in terms of the winner’s’ virtual utility
rather than his actual utility. This result is nontrivial despite its well known counterpart in the static
framework; the main complication in the proof is that the bidders’ incentive constraints depend on
the dynamic stochastic nature of the seller’s optimal search problem.
The optimal search mechanisms we study here give rise to new types of distortions that are
completely absent in static mechanism design problems. In Sections 4.1–4.3, we present three
of these distortions: we show that asymmetry of information leads to fewer participants, longer
1Our model can be interpreted as a procurement model where a buyer wishes to buy a good from one of several
suppliers whose types are independently drawn from bidder-specific distributions, and whose costs are interdependent.
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search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.
Section 4.4 presents another feature of optimal search auctions: When the ex post values
of bidders are interdependent, the seller wants to delay the participation of “influential” bidders,
whose types have a strong effect on the willingness of others to pay for the good.
Our findings extend existing results in traditional mechanism design theory by endogenizing
the set of participants through a stochastic, history-contingent, search procedure.2 Myerson [11]
has characterized the optimal (profit maximizing) auctions in the case where the seller incurs no
search cost when contacting potential bidders, so there is no loss to assume that they all partic-
ipate. Hence his solution arises as a special case in our framework. McAfee and McMillan [9]
characterize optimal search mechanisms in the special case where bidders are ex ante symmetric
in terms of the search cost and the distribution of their types. Hence the sequence of entry and the
resulting distortions which play a major role in our paper do not matter in their model. We allow
bidders to be ex ante asymmetric so the sequence of entry is important, and we find some features
of the optimal sequence in Sections 3.2, 4.3, and 4.4. Moreover, McAfee and McMillan assume
that there is no discounting so that it does not hurt the seller to contact only one bidder at a time.
We allow discounting so the seller may need to contact a group of bidders in a period.
Two other papers have also applied search theory to auction design. Burguet [4] considers
a procurement model with private-value ex ante symmetric bidders who must decide whether or
not to participate before knowing their types. In Cre´mer, Spiegel, and Zheng [6], we generalize
Burguet’s results, in the context of an auction model, by allowing for the entry of multiple bidders
at each stage and allowing for both interdependent valuation and asymmetric bidders. Unlike these
two papers, which assume ex ante participation constraints, this paper uses interim participation
constraints, as bidders are privately informed about their types during their participation decisions.
To the best of our knowledge, other than McAfee and McMillan [9] and Burguet [4], we
are the only ones optimizing over the rules of the auctions (as opposed to comparing specific
auction formats) given the constraints of costly participation. Other important works on mechanism
design with information acquisition or costly participation include Bergemann and Pesendorfer [1],
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [2], Levin and Smith [8], and Ye [18]. (See Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [3]
2Our analysis may also contribute to the optimal search literature by highlighting a new parallel search problem
where the ex post social surplus from selling the good to a bidder depends on the signals of other potential bidders,
whether they have participated or not. We have not found any work in that literature that considers this problem.
Weitzman [16] and Vishwanath [15] considered only private values. Even for private values, the literature has no
general characterization of optimal search procedures that allow multiple entrants per period, which we consider.
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for a recent survey.) Unlike these papers, which assume that the agents’ participation decisions are
made independently of each other, this paper allows an agent’s entry decision to depend on the
history of a mechanism. With this dynamic feature, our paper is somewhat related to Compte and
Jehiel [5] and Rezende [13], who analyze the effect of information acquisition conducted during
ascending price auctions.3
2 The Model
2.1 Search costs
A seller wants to sell an indivisible good to one out of a finite set I of prospective bidders. Initially,
bidders do not know the seller’s intention to sell the good and are not aware of the auction setting
(the rules of the auction, the number and identity of other bidders, and the distribution of bidders’
valuations). To bring this information to a bidder i’s attention, the seller incurs a bidder-specific
fixed cost ci > 0, which we call search cost. While learning the information, the bidder also
privately learns his own type which affects (but is not necessarily equal to) his ex post valuation.
The cost ci has several possible interpretations. First, if the seller’s good is very complex
(e.g., the controlling block of a state-owned enterprise), the seller may need to meet potential
bidders in person and describe the good in detail.4 Second, although we consider an auction
environment, our framework can be easily modified to a procurement environment in which a
procurer wishes to procure an indivisible good from a set of potential suppliers. If the procurer’s
3There are a few other interesting papers on specific auction formats with information acquisition or costly partic-
ipation, including Gal, Landsberger, and Nemirovski [7], Stegeman [14], Pesendorfer and Wolinsky [12], and Wolin-
sky [17]. However, unlike in our paper, the participation or information acquisition decisions in these papers are not
coordinated by a principal.
4If the seller has goals other than profit maximization, he may also have to meet with potential bidders in person in
order to ensure that they meet certain criteria (e.g., ensure that a privatized state-owned enterprise will be controlled
by a qualified manager). In this paper however we do not consider this possibility explicitly; doing so may require us
to consider additional dimensions of the buyers’ private information beyond their valuation of the seller’s good (e.g.,
their level of “competence”). Moreover, in many examples it is likely that bidders may also have to incur costs in order
to participate in the seller’s mechanism. In this paper however, we focus exclusively on the case where only the seller
needs to incur search costs. In Cre´mer, Spiegel and Zheng [6], we consider the other extreme case and assume that
the buyers need to incur costs to learn their types before they can participate in the seller’s mechanism. It would be
interesting in future research to study the harder case where both the seller and the buyers need to incur search costs.
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needs are complex and hard to describe, he would need to understand exactly what each supplier
can offer. For instance, consider a firm that wants to outsource a custom-made component; in some
cases, rather than sending the description to a prospective supplier and asking for a price quote,
it could be more efficient to ask for a description of the supplier’s manufacturing facilities and
explain what type of steps need to be taken with these specific facilities in order to produce the
good. The supplier can then provide a quote.5
2.2 Utility functions and types
The value of the good to the seller is x0. For each bidder i, nature draws a type xi from a commonly
known distribution Fi, with density fi and support Xi = [xi, xi], with fi > 0 over the interior of
Xi. Types are independent across i. Denote
x := (xi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈IXi =: X.
As in Myerson [11], given any x, bidder i’s value of the good is equal to
ui(x) := xi +
∑
j∈I\i
eij(xj),
where eij is a commonly known real function that reflects bidder j’s influence on bidder i’s value.
Hence, bidder i’s value for the good depends not only on his own type, xi, but also on the types
of other bidders through the functions {eij(·)}j∈I\i. Everyone’s discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1]. If
bidder i pays pti dollars in period t, then his utility from the viewpoint of period s is δt
′−sui(x) −∑∞
t=s δ
t−spti if he gets the good in period t′ ≥ s, and −
∑∞
t=s δ
t−spti if he never gets it. The seller
uses the same discount factor to evaluate his present discounted profit.
2.3 Search mechanisms
When the seller needs to incur costs to contact specific bidders, it is in general suboptimal (both
socially and from the seller’s viewpoint) to commit in advance to a fixed set of participants without
knowing the bidding history. Hence the seller picks a contingent plan that, based on the messages
of the “incumbents”, specifies whether the seller should (i) stop the mechanism and either keep the
5Another example might be a movie producer looking for a location to shoot a new movie. In order to get price
quotes from the various potential locations, the producer needs to examine the exact facilities that each location can
offer. Only then can the producer tell which facilities it would need and obtain a price quote.
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good or allocate it to an incumbent bidder, or (ii) continue and invite new bidders. Coupled with a
payment scheme, such a contingent plan is called a search mechanism. Note that parallel search is
allowed since the seller can invite several entrants at once.
At the start of period 1, the seller contacts a set of entrants. If an entrant agrees to participate,
he signs with the seller a binding contingency contract. Since he is privately informed before
signing the contract, a bidder’s participation constraint is interim.6 Each period-1 entrant then
sends a message. Given these messages, either the mechanism stops and the seller keeps the good
or allocates it to a period-1 entrant, or the mechanism continues to period 2 and more entrants
are invited. Depending on the information disclosure policy that the seller adopts as part of the
mechanism, each period-2 entrant is told none, or part of, or all of the messages sent by previous
entrants. Therefore, a new entrant need not even know what the current period is. Given the
disclosed information, each period-2 entrant decides whether to participate; if he does, he sends a
message. Depending on the messages sent in periods 1 and 2, the mechanism either continues and
a new set of entrants is invited to participate in period 3, or the mechanism stops. In the latter case,
the seller keeps the good or allocates it to a period-1 or period-2 entrant. The mechanism continues
in a similar fashion until it stops and the good is allocated.
2.4 Revelation search mechanisms
A revelation search mechanism is a search mechanism in which each bidder i’s message space
is i’s type space. A search mechanism, as a multistage game, is equilibrium feasible if it has a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A revelation search mechanism is incentive feasible if it has
a PBE where every invited bidder participates and is truthful.
The next lemma allows us to restrict attention to revelation search mechanisms without loss.
Its proof is similar to the proof of the standard revelation principle and hence is omitted.
Lemma 1 (Revelation Principle for Search Mechanisms). There exists an incentive feasible
revelation search mechanism that replicates the equilibrium outcome of any equilibrium feasible
search mechanism.
Given a revelation search mechanism, suppose that the profile of realized values is x ∈ X
and every invited bidder participates and is truthful. Then the mechanism induces the following
6We assume that a seller cannot make a buyer commit to a payment plan before the buyer knows his type. Other-
wise, the buyer would be besieged by dishonest sellers selling him fake projects or goods of no value whatsoever.
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objects. (The formal definition is in the appendix.)
Et(x) := the set of potential bidders who enter the mechanism in period t;
qi(x) := the probability with which player i (bidder or seller) consumes the good;
pi(x) := the total payment made by bidder i discounted back to the period
at which i enters the mechanism;
Hi(x) := the event (set of possible states) that bidder i knows has occurred
when i is entering the mechanism;
ti(x) := the period at which player i enters the mechanism (i ∈ Eti(x)(x));
τ(x) := the period at which the search terminates;
I t(x) := ∪ts=1Es(x) = the set of incumbents at the end of period t.
A revelation search mechanism is denoted ((Et)∞t=1, q, (pi, Hi)i∈I). A search procedure is the
operation-research part of a revelation search mechanism; it determines the set of entrants in each
period and the identity of the winner of the good but not how much to charge or what information
to disclose. Denote a search procedure by ((Et)∞t=1, q).7
The sequential nature of a search mechanism is formulated into the following constraints
(which are implied by the formal definition in the appendix):
1. E1 is constant on X , i.e., the set of entrants in period 1 is determined without any message.
2. If two realized profiles x and x′ of bidder-values generate the same history up to period
t ≥ 1, i.e, Es(x) = Es(x′) for all s = 1, . . . , t, and if xi = x′i for all incumbents i ∈ I t(x),
then x and x′ induce the same decisions for period t+ 1:
a. The set of entrants in period t+1 is the same and this set is a subset of potential bidders
who have not yet entered, i.e., Et+1(x) = Et+1(x′) ⊆ I \ I t(x).
b. If t = τ(x), then q(x) = q(x′) and pi(x) = pi(x′) for every potential bidder i; i.e., if
the mechanism stops at period t, then the allocation rule is the same for x and x′, and
the payment is the same for x and x′.
c. For any i who enters the mechanism in period t + 1, Hi(x) = Hi(x′), i.e., the news
disclosed to entrant i is the same for x and x′.8
7Note: ((Et)∞t=1) determines the period τ(x) in which the search ends: τ(x) = max{s = 1, 2, . . . : Es(x) 6= ∅}.
8Constraint 2.c implies that a participant cannot learn about the types of those who have not participated. To prove
6
3. The good cannot go to bidders who do not participate in the mechanism, nor can the seller
collect payments from such bidders, i.e., i /∈ Iτ(x)(x)⇒ qi(x) = pi(x) = 0.
The functions (Hi)i∈I constitute the disclosure policy of the mechanism. In a non-disclosure
policy, a bidder upon entry learns only the fact that the mechanism is contacting him at the current
period without knowing what the current period is. In a full disclosure policy, for any profile x of
realized values and in any period t, every entrant knows the sequence (Es(x))ts=1 of entry up to
now, as well as the reported type xj of every incumbent j ∈ I t−1(x).
Whatever the disclosure policy, the bidders are told the mechanism. A bidder makes the
participation decision only after he has been informed of his type and whatever the disclosure
policy reveals to him, including all the rules of the mechanism.
The above notations implicitly assume that the seller does not fully randomize on the search
procedure. This assumption causes no loss of generality, because the seller and bidders are all
risk-neutral. Our formal definition in the Appendix does allow full randomization.
2.5 Notions of optimal search mechanisms
Given any search procedure ((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I), if all invited bidders participate and are truthful, and
if the seller gets the entire surplus, then the seller’s expected profit discounted to period 1 is
Π((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I | (ui)i∈I) := Ex
δτ(x)−1 [∑
i∈I
qi(x) (ui(x)− x0)
]
−
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
∑
i∈Et(x)
ci
 . (1)
Note that there is no need to quantify the first sum by the restriction that i is a participant, because
if i is not a participant then qi(x) = 0 by constraint 3 in the previous subsection.
In traditional search theory there is no asymmetric information once the search cost has
been incurred. Thus, optimal search amounts to maximizing Π((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I | (ui)i∈I) over
all search procedures. We call this unconstrained maximization problem symmetric-information
search problem relative to payoffs (ui)i∈I and say that its solution is symmetric-information optimal
relative to payoffs ui. In our auction environment, by contrast, after the seller incurs a search cost
and contacts a bidder, the bidder becomes privately informed about his type. Hence the seller needs
to design a search mechanism that induces the bidders to reveal their private information truthfully.
that, suppose at state x, i enters in period t+ 1 and j has not entered by the end of period t+ 1 (i.e., i ∈ Et+1(x) and
j 6∈ It+1(x)). For any possible type x′j of j, denote (x−j , x′j) for the state such that the type of j is x′j and the type of
everyone else is the same in x. By 2.c, Hi(x) = Hi(x−j , x′j), hence i has no way to update about j’s type.
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A search procedure ((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I) is optimal (profit maximizing) if Π((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I | (ui)i∈I)
is maximized over all search procedures subject to interim participation and incentive compatibility
constraints. Similarly, a search mechanism is optimal if it implements an optimal search procedure.
3 Optimal search mechanisms
For every potential bidder i ∈ I and any possible realized profile x := (xi)i∈I of bidder-values,
define the (ex post) virtual utility of bidder i to be
Vi(x) := xi − 1− Fi(xi)
fi(xi)
+
∑
j∈I\i
eij(xj). (2)
Following most of the optimal auction literature, we make the following assumption which extends
the usual monotone hazard rate assumption to the case of interdependent values.
Assumption 1. For any potential bidders i and j, xi − 1−Fi(xi)fi(xi) and eji(xi) are differentiable func-
tions of xi on Xi, their derivatives are uniformly bounded, and ddxi
(
xi − 1−Fi(xi)fi(xi)
)
> e′ji(xi) ≥ 0
over the interior of Xi.
Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 holds, then (a) disclosure policies do not affect the seller’s expected
profit, and (b) there is an optimal search mechanism that uses the symmetric-information optimal
search procedure relative to virtual utility functions (Vi)i∈I .
Hence a profit-maximizing seller just needs to solve a distorted symmetric-information search
problem, where real utilities (ui)i∈I are replaced by virtual utilities (Vi)i∈I . Moreover, the seller can
pick any disclosure policy ranging from non-disclosure to full disclosure. Once he finds a search
procedure that solves the distorted problem and arbitrarily picks a disclosure policy, the seller just
needs to implement them with a payment scheme satisfying the familiar envelope formula.
The irrelevance of disclosure policies might be unexpected. Here we sketch the economic
reasoning behind the proof. Note that no matter how complicated a search procedure is, from the
seller’s and each bidder’s viewpoint, what matters is the bidder’s discounted expected probability
of winning, conditional on the bidder’s own type and the bidder’s information set about the types
of the other bidders. The latter is disclosed to the bidder by the revelation search mechanism only
when the bidder is about to act (who acts only once in the mechanism). As long as an appropriate
monotonicity condition holds, the seller can induce each bidder to be truthful by offering the bidder
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a payment plan conditional on the bidder’s information set. Hence the seller’s discounted surplus
extracted from each bidder i is uniquely determined by the bidder’s type, xi, and the bidder’s
information set, Hi. Before the search procedure starts, the seller’s discounted expected surplus
extracted from bidder i is calculated by integrating the surplus extracted from i across all possible
information sets Hi that the mechanism may disclose to this bidder. Note that these information
sets constitute a partition on the set of possible realized value-profiles x−i of the other bidders.
Hence this integration is the same as integrating across all the possible realized values of x−i,
which is independent of the disclosure policy. Thus, the surplus that the seller extracts from each
bidder i is uniquely determined by the bidder’s type xi and is independent of the disclosure policy.
3.1 The proof of the theorem
We prove Theorem 1 in three steps. First, in Subsection 3.1.1, we show that the seller’s opti-
mal discounted expected profit is bounded from above by the optimal payoff from the distorted
symmetric-information search problem. Second, we show in Subsection 3.1.2 that the solution for
this distorted symmetric-information problem is incentive compatible given full disclosure policy.
Finally, based on step two, we show in Subsection 3.1.3 that the seller can achieve the upper bound
in step one via full disclosure. Since other disclosure policies cannot yield less expected profit
than full disclosure, any disclosure policy, coupled with a solution for the distorted symmetric-
information search problem, is optimal for the seller.
3.1.1 Step one: Finding necessary conditions for incentive feasibility and optimality
By Lemma 1, we can confine attention to revelation search mechanisms. Consider a revelation
search mechanism, described by the notations Et, qi, Hi, ti, and τ introduced in Section 2.4.
Assume that bidder i is invited at some period. Let Hi be the information set disclosed to
bidder i before he reports his type. If he reports that his type is xˆi, then from the viewpoint of
the current period (which depends on the realized state and may be unknown to i), the discounted
expected value of his winning probability is
Qi(xˆi | Hi) = Ex−i
[
δτ(xˆi,x−i)−ti(xˆi,x−i)qi(xˆi, x−i) | Hi = Hi(xˆi, x−i)
]
, (3)
and the discounted expected value of other bidders’ influence on bidder i’s utility is
e−i(xˆi | Hi) = Ex−i
δτ(xˆ,x−i)−ti(xˆ,x−i)qi(xˆ, x−i) ∑
j∈I\i
eij(xj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Hi = Hi(xˆi, x−i)
 . (4)
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The discounted expected value of bidder i’s payment from this viewpoint is calculated analogously
and denoted by Pi(xˆi | Hi). If bidder i’s realized type is xi, then his discounted expected utility
from the viewpoint of the current period is
ui(xˆi | xi,Hi) = xiQi(xˆi | Hi) + e−i(xˆi | Hi)− Pi(xˆi | Hi). (5)
Given the independence of bidders’ types, none of Qi(xˆi | Hi), Pi(xˆi | Hi) and e−i(xˆi | Hi)
vary with bidder i’s actual type. Thus, each bidder i’s objective function takes the quasilinear
form xiAi(xˆi) + Bi(xˆi), standard in auction theory. This quasilinear form, coupled with standard
techniques (e.g., Myerson [11, Lemma 2]), yields the next lemma.
Lemma 2. The seller’s problem is equivalent to maximizing his discounted expected profit among
all pairs of search procedures ((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I) and disclosure rules (Hi)i∈I subject to the follow-
ing constraints for any i ∈ I , any xi ∈ Xi, and any Hi in the range of Hi ({Hi(x) : x ∈ X}):
the function Qi(· | Hi) is nondecreasing; (6)
ui(xi | xi,Hi) = ui(xi | xi,Hi) +
∫ xi
xi
Qi(z | Hi)dz; (7)
ui(xi | xi,Hi) = 0. (8)
A revelation search mechanism is incentive feasible if (6) is satisfied and the payment scheme
satisfies the envelope formula,
Pi(xi | Hi) = xiQi(xi | Hi) + e−i(xi | Hi)−
∫ xi
xi
Qi(z | Hi)dz (9)
for any i ∈ I , any xi ∈ Xi, and any Hi in the range of Hi.
The next lemma is similar to the “integration by parts” routine in optimal auction theory.
Lemma 3. If a revelation search mechanism with any disclosure policy is incentive feasible, then
the seller’s discounted expected profit is Π((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I | (Vi)i∈I), where ((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I) is
the search procedure of the mechanism.
Proof: Let bidder i enter at period t and be informed of information set Hi. By Eqs. (5), (7),
and (8), the seller’s expected net profit extracted from bidder i discounted to period t is
Exi
[
(xi − x0)Qi(xi | Hi) + e−i(xi | Hi)−
∫ xi
xi
Qi(z | Hi)dz − ci
]
.
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By a standard argument (e.g., Myerson [11, Lemma 3]), this is equal to
Ex
[
δτ(x)−tqi(x) (Vi(x)− x0)− ci | Hi = Hi(x)
]
,
where we used Eqs. (2), (3), and (4). Viewed from period 1, the period t at which bidder i enters the
mechanism is a random variable uniquely determined by the profile x of realized values: t = ti(x).
Thus, viewed from period 1, the seller’s expected profit extracted from bidder i is
Et
[
EHi
[
Ex
[
δτ(x)−1qi(x) (Vi(x)− x0)− δt−1ci
] | Hi = Hi(x)] | t = ti(x)]
= Ex
δτ(x)−1qi(x) (Vi(x)− x0)− ∑
t: t=ti(x)
δt−1ci
 . (10)
Summing the right-hand side (10) over all i ∈ I (and noting that t = ti(x)⇔ i ∈ Et(x)), we get
Ex
δτ(x)−1 [∑
i∈I
qi(x) (Vi(x)− x0)
]
−
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
∑
i∈Et(x)
ci
 , (11)
which is equal to Π((Et)∞t=1, (qi)i∈I | (Vi)i∈I), defined in Eq. (1), with Vi replacing ui. 
Remark: We would have obtained the traditional recipe of optimal auction by now had search
costs been zero: for every state x, set qi(x) := 1 for the bidder i whose virtual utility is highest
among all bidders and exceeds x0. This, however, is in general infeasible for a search mechanism,
because the seller does not know the realized types of bidders who have not yet been contacted.
3.1.2 Step two: Verifying the incentive feasibility condition
The purpose of the second step is to show that the solution for the seller’s distorted symmetric-
information problem is incentive compatible given full disclosure policy. To this end, recall that,
in the distorted symmetric-information search problem, the seller tries to maximize the discounted
expected value of virtual utility of the winner of the good minus search costs. Denote:
((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) := a search procedure that solves the distorted
symmetric-information search problem.
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Next, at any period, denote:
J := the set of incumbents, bidders who have entered;
xJ := (xi)i∈J ; x−J := (xi)i/∈J ;
pi(J, xJ) := the seller’s optimal discounted expected payoff
given the state variable (J, xJ);
pi+(J, xJ) := the seller’s optimal discounted expected payoff
from continuing the search given (J, xJ)
= δ max
K⊆I\J
[
ExKpi(J ∪K;xJ , xK)−
∑
k∈K
ck
]
. (12)
The above objects are well defined because a straightforward proof by induction implies that the
search procedure ((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) exists and the function pi is well defined.
At each period, given the state variable (J, xJ) for distorted symmetric-information search
problem, the seller’s alternatives, described relative to any incumbent i ∈ J , are: (i) sell the good
to i right now, getting Ex−JVi(x), (ii) sell to another incumbent j 6= i right now, getting Ex−JVj(x);
(iii) continue search thus getting pi+(J, xJ); or (iv) stop and consume the good, getting x0. The
next lemma says that alternative (i) is more likely to be the best option if i’s type xi is high.
Lemma 4. If i ∈ J , then Ex−JVi(xJ , x−J) and pi+(J, xJ) are absolutely continuous functions of xi;
whenever their derivatives exist,
∂
∂xi
Ex−JVi(xJ , x−J) >
∂
∂xi
max
j∈J\i
Ex−JVj(xJ , x−J) and (13)
∂
∂xi
Ex−JVi(xJ , x−J) ≥
∂
∂xi
pi+(J, xJ), (14)
and if (14) holds with equality then Ex−JVi(xJ , x−J) ≥ pi+(J, xJ).
Proof: By Eq. (2), ∂
∂xi
Ex−JVi(xJ , x−J) = ddxi
[
xi − 1−Fi(xi)fi(xi)
]
, and, for all j 6= i, xi enters Vj(x)
only through eji(xi). Hence Assumption 1 implies (13).
To prove (14), we use a revealed-preference argument. Let (J, xJ) be given. Denote
Q˜k(xJ) := the discounted expected probability that ((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) awards (15)
the good to bidder k (who need not has entered) given (J, xJ).
Assume that the seller follows the search procedure ((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) as if the type of an incumbent
i ∈ J is xˆi 6= xi. (The seller knows the realized value of xi because this is a symmetric-information
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search problem.) Let pˆi+(J, xJ , xˆi) be the expected payoff of the seller from this deviant plan,
discounted back to the current period t; xi enters pˆi+(J, xJ , xˆi) only in the term
Ex−J
∑
k∈I
δτ(xJ\i,xˆi,x−J )−tVk(xJ\i, xi, x−J)q˜k(xJ\i, xˆi, x−J).
Hence (remember that xi is one component of xJ )
∂
∂xi
pˆi+(J, xJ , xˆi) = Q˜i(xˆi, xJ\i)
d
dxi
[
xi − 1− Fi(xi)
fi(xi)
]
+
∑
k∈I\i
Q˜k(xˆi, xJ\i)e′ki(xi).
As ((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) solves the dynamic programming problem given the state variable (J, xJ),
pi+(J, xJ) = pˆi+(J, xJ , xˆi) = max
xˆi
pˆi+(J, xJ , xˆi).
Thus, the Milgrom-Segal envelope theorem ([10]) implies that pi+(J, xJ) is an absolutely continu-
ous function of xi and that, whenever its derivative exists,
∂
∂xi
pi+(J, xJ) = Q˜i(xi, xJ\i)
d
dxi
[
xi − 1− Fi(xi)
fi(xi)
]
+
∑
k∈I\i
Q˜k(xi, xJ\i)e′ki(xi). (16)
Thus, Assumption 1 implies (14). If (14) holds with equality, bidder i wins almost surely in
subsequent periods if the search were to continue. But since search is costly, this implies in turn
that awarding the good to bidder i immediately dominates the option of continuing the search.
Hence Ex−JVi(xJ , x−J) ≥ pi+(J, xJ). 
We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this subsection.
Lemma 5. If Assumption 1 holds, then the search procedure ((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) operated under the
full disclosure policy satisfies the monotonicity condition (6), i.e., Qi(· | Hi) is nondecreasing for
any information set Hi in the range of the full-disclosure rule.
Proof: Let J ⊆ I be the set of incumbents and let i ∈ J . It suffices to prove that Q˜i(xJ), defined
by (15), is weakly increasing in xi. We shall prove this claim by induction on the size of I \ J .
The case of J = I follows directly from (13). Pick any n = 1, 2, . . . and suppose the claim is true
if the size of I \ J is less than or equal to n− 1. We shall prove the claim when I \ J is of size n.
Since the search procedure ((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) solves the problem
max
{
x0,Ex−JVi(xJ , x−J),max
j∈J\i
Ex−JVj(xJ , x−J), pi+(J, xJ)
}
,
Lemma 4 implies that the probability that bidder i wins in the current period is weakly increasing
in xi. The induction hypothesis implies that the probability (discounted back to next period) that
he wins later, conditional on him not winning in the current period, is weakly increasing in xi.
Thus, the total discounted winning probability of bidder i is weakly increasing in xi, as desired. 
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3.1.3 Step three: The irrelevance of disclosure policies
To complete this final step of the proof, we show that the full-disclosure mechanism identified
in 3.1.2 is optimal among all incentive feasible mechanisms under any disclosure policy. That
is true because the full-disclosure mechanism, by definition of its search procedure, achieves the
upper bound identified in 3.1.1 if the mechanism is incentive feasible, and we have proved in 3.1.2
that it is indeed incentive feasible. Thus, disclosure policies are irrelevant because, as we will show
below, other disclosure policies cannot yield smaller expected profit than full disclosure.
Formally, denote:
ΠFD, ΠANY := the seller’s optimal discounted expected profit among all incentive
feasible search mechanisms using, respectively, FD,ANY ;
FD,ANY := full disclosure, any disclosure policy.
Since bidders are assumed to be risk neutral, incentive feasibility with a fine disclosure policy
implies incentive feasibility with a coarse disclosure policy. (Incentive feasibility means a set of
inequalities, one for each event that the disclosure policy can possibly reveal to a bidder; integration
across these events preserves the direction of the inequalities.) Hence
ΠANY ≥ ΠFD.
Lemma 3 implies that ΠANY is bounded from above by the optimal discounted expected payoff in
the distorted symmetric-information search problem. Since ((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) is a solution for this
distorted problem, we have
Π
(
(E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I | (Vi)i∈I
)
≥ ΠANY .
Lemma 5, coupled with Lemma 2, implies that the search procedure ((E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I) is incentive
feasible when it is supplemented by the full disclosure policy. Hence
ΠFD ≥ Π
(
(E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I | (Vi)i∈I
)
.
Thus, we obtain the equation that immediately implies the theorem:
ΠANY = ΠFD = Π
(
(E˜t)∞t=1, (q˜i)i∈I | (Vi)i∈I
)
.
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3.2 An optimal mechanism with private values and no discounting
In this subsection we illustrate Theorem 1 by fully characterizing the optimal mechanism for the
case where the bidders have private values (eij = 0 for all i, j ∈ I) and there is no discounting
(δ = 1). Since the distributions of bidders’ types and the cost of contacting each bidder are not
necessarily the same across bidders, the results in this subsection generalize the results in McAfee
and McMillan [9] where the bidders are assumed to be ex ante identical.
By Theorem 1, the seller needs to solve the distorted symmetric-information search problem,
where his reward from selling the good to a bidder is the bidder’s virtual utility. With private values,
a bidder’s virtual utility depends only on his own type (hence we write Vi(xi) instead of Vi(x)):
Vi(xi) = xi − 1− Fi(xi)
fi(xi)
. (17)
This symmetric-information search problem is similar to Weitzman’s [16] Pandora problem. In
that problem, Pandora searches for the highest reward from n boxes under the assumption that
only one box can be opened in any single period and opening each box is costly. Weitzman proved
that the solution to Pandora’s problem is as follows. First, Pandora computes a cutoff value for
each box—this cutoff value depends only on the characteristics of the box itself. Then, if the
highest cutoff value falls short of Pandora’s initial fallback reward, Pandora does not search and
simply gets the fallback reward. Otherwise, Pandora opens the box with the highest cutoff value. In
every period, the search continues if the highest cutoff among all closed boxes exceeds the updated
fallback reward which is the maximum between the initial fallback reward and the highest reward
among all opened boxes. If seach ends, Pandora gets the updated fallback reward.
In our case, the boxes are the potential bidders, and since they are privately informed about
their types after being contacted by the seller, the seller’s reward from each bidder is the bidder’s
virtual utility. The initial fallback reward is just x0. Since we assume away discounting, there
is no loss of generality in inviting only one entrant (i.e., “opening one box”) in each period as
Weitzman’s Pandora problem. The relevant cutoff level v∗i for bidder i is the solution of
Exi
[
(Vi(xi)− v∗i )+
]
= ci. (18)
This equation is analogous to Eq. (7) in Weitzman [16]. It says that, if the seller’s updated fallback
payoff is v∗i , then the seller is indifferent between (i) stopping the search and getting v∗i immedi-
ately, and (ii) contacting bidder i at a cost of ci and then stopping the search and getting a payoff
equal to either Vi(xi) or v∗i , whichever higher. When the seller invites bidder i to participate, the
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bidder makes a report xˆi and commits to paying, in expected value, an amount Pi(xˆi | Hi) specified
by Eq. (9). The seller keeps searching as long as the highest cutoffs among all bidders who have
not yet been contacted exceeds the updated fallback reward. Otherwise the seller stops searching
and allocates the good to the bidder with the highest virtual utility among all incumbent bidders,
provided that this virtual utility exceeds the seller’s value, x0, or keeps the good otherwise.
Note that, in the above procedure, a participating bidder i can end the search and buy the good
immediately if he reports his type as xˆi such that Vi(xˆi) is greater than both the virtual utilities of
the incumbents and the cutoffs of those not yet contacted. Denote x∗i for the infimum of such types
xˆi. We may call the expected payment Pi(x∗i | Hi) specified by Eq. (9) the buy-now price, as if the
bidder were given a buy-now offer to buy the good immediately at the price equal to Pi(x∗i | Hi).
One way to construct such buy-now prices is as follows: Every participating bidder makes
a once-and-for-all bid. Bids are compared to one another in terms of virtual utilities. If a bidder
rejects the buy-now offer but eventually wins the good, his payment is equal to the amount which,
in terms of virtual utilities, matches the highest losing bid or the seller’s own value, whichever is
larger. To compute the buy-now prices, suppose the bids collected up to the end of period t− 1 are
x1, . . . , xt−1, with xs submitted by the period-s entrant, bidder s. The seller’s fallback reward is
vt−1 := max
{
x0,max
s<t
Vs(xs)
}
.
Suppose that bidder t enters in period t. There are only two possible cases:
i. v∗t+1 ≤ vt−1: the cutoff v∗t+1 for contacting the next bidder is below the seller’s current
fallback reward vt−1, so the search will end no matter what bidder t reports. If bidder t
wants to win right now, all that he needs is to submit a bid xt such that Vt(xt) ≥ vt−1, i.e.,
xt ≥ V −1t (vt−1).9 Hence the buy-now price for bidder t is V −1t (vt−1).
ii. v∗t+1 > vt−1: the cutoff for continuing the search is above the seller’s current fallback reward,
so the search may end or continue, depending on bidder t’s report. If his virtual utility is
above v∗t+1, then bidder t beats all incumbents and ends the search; yet if his virtual utility is
merely equal to vt−1, the search will continue. Thus, the buy-now price, in terms of virtual
utilities, should lie between v∗t+1 and vt−1. To compute it, first calculate the probabilityQ∗t (z)
with which bidder t eventually wins in the above search procedure if he reports z, then use
9The inverse function V −1t exists by Assumption 1.
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Eq. (9) to obtain the buy-now price as
V −1t (v
∗
t+1)−
∫ V −1t (v∗t+1)
V −1t (vt−1)
Q∗t (z)dz.
When all bidders have the same distribution for their types (although the search costs of con-
tacting them may be different), it is possible to implement the optimal search mechanism with a
sequence of second-price auctions with period-specific reserve prices. The next subsection illus-
trates this idea by a two-bidders example, whose extension to the n-bidder case is straightforward.
A further special case in which the search costs are also the same across bidders (i.e., the
bidders are ex ante identical) has been analyzed by McAfee and McMillan [9]. Since the bidders
are ex-ante identical, the cutoffs v∗i defined by Eq. (18) are identical across bidders. Thus, unlike in
most of our paper, the sequence in which the bidders are contacted is irrelevant. Search continues
if and only if the highest virtual utility among all incumbent bidders is less than the cutoff. When
all bidders have been invited, the good is sold via a conventional second-price auction with reserve.
3.3 A two-bidder example with private values and no discounting
In this subsection we examine a specific two-bidder example that illustrates how the optimal mech-
anism can be computed. Suppose there are only two potential bidders and xi ∼ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2.
The cost of contacting bidder i is ci, with c1 < c2 < 14 . As in Section 3.2, we assume that
e12 = e21 = 0 (private values), and δ = 1. Hence, the profit optimal search auction is a Weitzman
search procedure with the bidders’ values replaced by their virtual utilities
Vi(x) = 2xi − 1. (19)
The seller will not sell the good to bidder i if Vi(x) ≤ 0; hence a bidder with xi ≤ 1/2 has a zero
probability of winning the good.
Using (18), the cutoffs, v∗1 and v∗2 are defined by∫ 1
1+v∗
i
2
[2x− 1− v∗i ] dx = ci, ⇐⇒ v∗i = 1− 2
√
ci.
Since c1 < c2 < 1/4, v∗1 > v∗2 > 0, it is optimal to invite bidder 1 in period 1, and if the search
continues, to invite bidder 2 in period 2.
Bidder 1 wins the good immediately if V1(x1) ≥ v∗2 , i.e., if x1 ≥ 1 −
√
c2. Otherwise, the
mechanism continues to period 2, and bidder 1 wins if and only if x1 > max {x2, 1/2}. Since
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x2 ∼ [0, 1], the probability that bidder 1 wins is 0 if x1 < 1/2, x1 if 12 ≤ x1 < 1 −
√
c2, and 1 if
x1 ≥ 1−√c2. Using (9), the expected payment of bidder 1 is
p1(x1) =

0, if x1 < 12 ;
x21 −
∫ x1
1
2
zdz =
x21
2
+ 1
8
, if 1
2
≤ x1 < 1−√c2;
x1 −
∫ 1−√c2
1
2
zdz − ∫ x1
1−√c2 dz =
1−c1
2
+ 1
8
, if x1 ≥ 1−√c2.
(20)
Conditional on being invited to participate, bidder 2 wins the good if and only if V2(x2) ≥
max {V1(x1), 0}, i.e., x2 > max
{
x1,
1
2
}
. By (9), the expected payment of bidder 2 is
p2(x2, x1) =
 0, if x2 ≤ max
{
x1,
1
2
}
;
x2 −
∫ x2
max{x1, 12} dz = max
{
x1,
1
2
}
, if x2 > max
{
x1,
1
2
}
.
The optimal mechanism can be implemented with the following procedure. Bidder 1 is
offered the good at price (1 − c2)/2 + 1/8 in period 1; if he rejects the offer, he and bidder 2
participate in period 2 in a second price auction with a reserve price equal to 1/2.10 Since both
bidders bid their values in the second price auction, bidder 2 wins if and only if x2 > max{x1, 1/2}
and his payment if he wins is max{x1, 1/2}. Hence, we only need to verify that bidder 1’s optimal
strategy in our procedure is aligned with the optimal mechanism.
In our procedure, bidder 1 has to pay at least 1/2 if he wins. Thus, if x1 ≤ 1/2, he does not
want to win, and it is dominant to bid his true type in both periods. In period 2, bidder 1 wins if
and only if x1 > max
{
x2,
1
2
}
, and if he wins, he pays max
{
x2,
1
2
}
; his expected payment is∫ 1
2
0
1
2
dx2 +
∫ x1
1
2
x2 dx2 =
1
8
+
x21
2
.
This expression is equal to the second line in Eq. (20).
Finally, to verify that bidder 1 accepts the offer in period 1 if and only if x1 ≥ 1 −√c2, we
note that bidder 1 has two options: (i) agree to pay 1−c2
2
+ 1
8
and obtain the good immediately, or
(ii) participate in the second price auction with bidder 2. Bidder 1’s payoff from option (i) is
x1 −
(
1− c2
2
+
1
8
)
.
With option (ii), bidder 1 wins with probability x1 and his expected payment is x
2
1
2
+ 1
8
; his expected
payoff is
x1x1 −
(
x21
2
+
1
8
)
=
x21
2
− 1
8
.
10Note that the procedure is equivalent to a sequence of two second price auctions, with period-specific reserve
prices. The first auction in the sequence is degenerate as only bidder 1 participates.
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Comparing bidder 1’s expected payoff under the two options shows that he will choose option (i)
if and only if x1 ≥ 1−√c2. Hence bidder 1’s strategy is consistent with the optimal mechanism.
4 Properties of profit maximizing search mechanisms
In standard auction theory, asymmetric information leads to inefficiencies in the form of no trade
in some states of nature, and, sometimes, biased allocations. In our search-theoretic framework,
asymmetric information leads to a third form of inefficiency: inefficient search procedures. In
Subsection 4.1, we show that the optimal mechanism may completely exclude some bidders who
would be invited to participate in the (socially) efficient mechanism. In Subsection 4.2, we show an
opposite effect: the optimal mechanism gives the seller an excessive incentive to search relative to
the efficient mechanism. In Subsection 4.3, we show that the order in which bidders are approached
need not be the same as the efficient mechanism.
In order to explore these kinds of inefficiency, we shall consider the private values case where
eij = 0 for all i, j ∈ I and there is no discounting.11 Given these assumptions, the seller’s optimal
search mechanism is fully characterized in Subsection 3.2. In particular, the optimal search proce-
dure is generated by Weitzman’s solution with the cutoffs being implicitly defined by Eq. (18). By
contrast, the cutoffs for a (socially) efficient procedure are defined by the equation
Exi [xi − x∗i ]+ = ci. (21)
This difference arises because the payoff in the associated search problem is measured in virtual
utilities in the former mechanism and is measured in actual utilities in the latter. In Cre´mer, Spiegel,
and Zheng [6] we proved that the efficient search procedure can always be implemented by a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.12
4.1 Fewer participants
Because a bidder’s actual value exceeds his virtual utility, the benefit of inviting a bidder to partic-
ipate is lower in an optimal search mechanism for the seller than it is in an efficient mechanism for
the economy if the fallback payoffs are the same. In fact, the optimal mechanism may completely
11By continuity, the inefficiencies that we identify still hold if these assumptions are slightly relaxed.
12Although the participation constraint is ex ante in that paper, its efficiency result is applicable here because interim
participation constraints can always be satisfied by transfers from the seller.
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exclude a bidder even before the search begins, even though that bidder has a positive probabil-
ity of participation in an efficient mechanism. The consequences of this fact are described in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. ¿From the standpoint of period 1, every bidder i’s probability of participation in a
socially efficient mechanism is positive if his probability of participation in an optimal mechanism
is positive, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Proof: For z ≤ xi, Exi [Vi(xi)− z]+ and Exi [xi − z]+ are strictly decreasing functions of z and
Exi [Vi(xi)− z]+ ≤ Exi [xi − z]+. Hence, v∗i < x∗i for all i ∈ I . The proof is completed by
noting that a bidder i has a positive probability of participating in the socially efficient mechanism
if x∗i > x0 and a positive probability of participation in the optimal mechanism only if v∗i ≥ x0. 
4.2 Longer search
As virtual utilities are below actual utilities, the seller’s fallback value in the optimal mechanism is
smaller than his fallback value in a socially efficient mechanism. This leads to an effect opposite
to the previous one, as the lower fallback value makes it more attractive to continue the search. A
simple case for this effect is that bidders’ types are i.i.d., so their virtual utility functions are the
same, say V , though their participation costs may still be different. While the cost of an additional
searching period is the same in both the efficient and optimal mechanisms, the gains are different.
To see that, suppose that an additional search increases the highest reported value and hence the
social surplus by ∆x. The resulting effect on the seller’s revenue, measured in virtual utilities, is
approximately V ′(x)∆x. Under Assumption 1, V ′(x) ≥ 1. Thus, other things equal, the seller is
more willing to continue searching than a social planner would.
Proposition 2. Assume that types xi are identically distributed across bidders, with V denoting
their common virtual utility function (though their participation costs ci may be different). If
Assumption 1 holds and if v∗i > x0 for all i ∈ I , then an optimal search lasts at least as long as,
and with a positive probability strictly longer, a socially efficient search.
Proof: First, recall that xi is the upper bound of the support of xi and let
φ(z) :=
∫ xi
z
(xi − z)dFi(xi); ϕ(z) :=
∫ xi
z
(Vi(xi)− Vi(z))dFi(xi).
The solution of ϕ(z) = ci is V −1i (v∗i ). By assumption V ′ > 1, ϕ′ < φ′ < 0 throughout their
common domain. Then the fact that φ(xi) = 0 = ϕ(xi) implies V −1(v∗i ) > x∗i for all i ∈ I .
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Second, the order of entry is the same in both mechanisms: with i.i.d. bidders, x∗i > x∗j if
and only if ci < cj if and only if v∗i > v∗j . Thus, we can relabel the bidders so that v∗1 ≥ v∗2 ≥
· · · ≥ v∗n and x∗1 ≥ x∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ x∗n. Because v∗i > x0, the optimal mechanism invites bidder 1
to participate. We show that it continues from period t to period t + 1 with a higher probability
than the socially efficient procedure. To see that, let (x1, . . . , xt) be the sequence of realized values
up to period t. If the efficient search continues to period t + 1, then max{x0, x1, . . . , xt} < x∗t+1;
because V −1(v∗i ) > x∗i and v∗i > x0,
v∗t+1 > max{x0, V1(x1), . . . , Vt(xt)}.
Hence the optimal search continues to period t + 1. Thus, it continues whenever the efficient
procedure continues. The converse, however, is false: when
x∗t+1 < max{x1, . . . , xt} < V −1(v∗t+1),
which occurs with a positive probability, the efficient search stops while the optimal search proce-
dure continues. This proves the proposition. 
4.3 Inefficient order of entry
Determined by different sets of cutoffs, the order in which the bidders enter the optimal mechanism
may differ from the order in the socially efficient mechanism. The following example shows
this distortion with two bidders. The seller’s value, x0, is zero; bidder 1’s type x1 is uniformly
distributed on [x1, x1] and bidder 2’s type x2 is drawn from an exponential distribution F2(x2) :=
1− exp(−λx2). Given these assumptions, the virtual utility functions and cutoffs are
V1(x1) = 2x1 − x1; V2(x2) = x2 − 1/λ;
x∗1 = x1 −
√
2c1(x1 − x1); x∗2 = − ln(λc2)/λ;
v∗1 = x1 − 2
√
c1(x1 − x1); v∗2 = − (1 + ln(λc2)) /λ.
Since x∗i > v∗i , there exist two numbers a and b such that v∗1 < a < b < x∗1. Let λ := 1/(b−a) and
c2 := exp(−λb)/λ. Then x∗1 > x∗2 and v∗1 < v∗2: bidder 2 enters first in the optimal mechanism,
whereas bidder 1 enters first in the socially efficient mechanism.
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4.4 Delayed participation of influential bidders
When bidders’ values are interdependent, we can address the following question: If bidder i’s type
has a stronger influence on the valuations of other bidders than bidder j’s type, should the seller
let i enter before j or vice versa? For simplicity, we address this question under the assumption
that, for all j ∈ I , there is a number αj such that eij(xj) = αjxj for all xj and i 6= j, with
αi ∈ [0, 1). We can therefore regard bidders with higher α’s as more influential. We show that
the more influential bidders will enter later than less influential bidders. As we will see, this is a
property linked to the sequential nature of the search mechanism, and not, as in Subsections 4.1
to 4.3, a distortion due to asymmetry of information.
Proposition 3. Assume Vi ≥ 0 and xi ≥ 0 for all i, and eji(xi) = αixi for all j 6= i. Also assume
that search costs and type-distributions are identical across i ∈ I . Then the larger αi is, the later
and less probable is i’s entry in an optimal or a socially efficient search mechanism.
Proof: For every i ∈ I and every xi ∈ Xi, let
Wi(xi) := xi − 1− Fi(xi)
fi(xi)
− αixi.
Note that Vi(x) = Wi(xi) +
∑
j∈I αjxj . Thus, for any state variable (J, xJ),
Ex−JVi(xJ , x−J) > Ex−JVj(xJ , x−J)⇐⇒ Wi(xi) > Wj(xj). (22)
Since Vi ≥ 0 by assumption, the optimal mechanism never results in no sale. Hence (22) implies
that the search procedure is equivalent to a standard Weitzman seach with payoff from search being
Wi(xi). In this search procedure, the cutoffs w∗i are implicitly defined by
Exi [Wi(xi)− w∗i ]+ = ci.
Exi [Wi(xi)− w∗i ]+ is strictly decreasing in w∗i and Wi(xi) is strictly decreasing αi (since xi ≥ 0
by assumption). Thus, w∗i is strictly decreasing in αi, as claimed.
The proof for the socially efficient mechanism is analogous and can be deduced by simply
setting Wi(xi) := xi − αixi for every i ∈ I and every xi ∈ Xi. 
The basic intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows: if there is a very influential bidder, a
change in his type will increase the value of other bidders nearly as much as it increases his own
value. Hence, inviting this bidder to participate in the mechanism early on will not reduce the set
of states of nature in which it would also be optimal to invite other bidders to participate and will
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therefore not save on search costs. To illustrate, assume that there are two bidders, with α1 = 1,
α2 = 0 and x0 = 0. Bidder 1 is therefore “influencial” as a change in x1 has a positive effect on
bidder 2’s value but not vice versa. Since bidder 2’s value, x2 + x1, always exceeds bidder 1’s
value, x1, it is clear that if the good is allocated, it is certainly allocated to bidder 2; thus, only
bidder 2 will be invited to participate. The influential bidder, bidder 1, is excluded.
5 Conclusion
We have studied a single unit auction environment in which the set of bidders is endogenously
determined through a dynamic search process. The distinctive feature of our model is that it al-
lows for discounting and asymmetry and value-interdependency across potential bidders. With
asymmetry and interdependency, the sequence in which bidders are contacted is important. With
discounting, some potential bidders may need to be contacted at the same time.
We showed that an optimal mechanism for the seller is equivalent to an optimal search with
symmetric information, where the utilities are replaced by virtual utilities. That is, the seller con-
ducts a costly search for the bidder with the highest virtual utility. In standard auction theory, the
information rents that the seller concedes to the bidders create inefficiencies in the form of no trade
in some states of nature and, sometimes, biased allocations. Our search-theoretic framework gives
rise to a third form of inefficiency: inefficient search procedures. In the case of private values with
no discounting, this inefficiency results in fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same
set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry, relative to the socially efficient mechanism.
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Appendix: A formal definition of revelation search mechanisms
In this appendix, we complement the informal definition of a sequential mechanism of 2.3 by a
formal definition, couched in decision theoretical language. This enables us to provide a formal
link between 2.3 and the definitions introduced in 2.4. To this end we first define a decision tree
for the seller which is associated with his search problem. Then we define a search procedure as a
transition function on the seller’s decision tree, and payment scheme and disclosure policy as plans
contingent on the nodes.13
The initial node of the decision tree, d0, is a decision node. The immediate successors of d0
are (d0, E1), where E1 ⊆ I is the set of period-1 entrants at that node; if E1 = ∅, then the seller
keeps the good without conducting any search. Each (d0, E1) is a history node. The immediate
successors of (d0, E1) are (d0, E1, x1), where x1 ∈ ×i∈E1Xi is the profile of the realized values of
period-1 entrants at that node. Each (d0, E1, x1) is a decision node at period 1.
Let dt := (d0, E1, x1, . . . , Et, xt) be a period-t decision node. The immediate successors
of dt are either (dt, w) or (dt, Et+1), where w ∈ ∪ts=1Es ∪ {seller} is the winner of the good
(which could be the seller), and Et+1 ⊆ I \ ∪ts=1Es, with14Et+1 6= ∅, is the set of period-(t + 1)
entrants. Each (dt, w) is a terminal node specifying who gets the good, while each (dt, Et+1)
is a nonterminal history node specifying the potential bidders who are invited to participate in
period t + 1. Note that if I \ ∪ts=1Es = ∅, then the immediate successors of dt are all terminal.
The immediate successors of any nonterminal history node (dt, Et+1) are (dt, Et+1, xt+1), where
xt+1 ∈ ×i∈Et+1Xi is the profile of the realized values of period-(t + 1) entrants at that node, and
(dt, Et+1, xt+1) is a period-(t+ 1) decision node. Hence a decision tree is recursively defined.
Let D be the set of all decision nodes. For any dt ∈ D, let
(dt)+ :=
{
(dt, w) : w ∈ ∪ts=1Es ∪ {seller}
} ∪ {(dt, Et+1) : ∅ 6= Et+1 ⊆ I \ ∪ts=1Es}
be the set of immediate successors of dt, and (D)+ be the set of successors of decision nodes. With
∆S denoting the set of lotteries on the outcome set S, a search procedure is a transition function
σ : D −→ ∆(D)+such thatσ(dt) ∈ ∆(dt)+.
13This type of formalism was first developed by Zheng [19].
14The assumption Et+1 6= ∅means that the seller does not stop searching for some periods and then start searching
again. This is trivially true for any optimal mechanism when δ < 1. When δ = 1, there exists an optimal mechanism
that satisfies this assumption.
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A payment scheme is a function p on the set (D)+ that assigns to each immediate successor
of (d0, E1, . . . , Et, xt) a profile (pti)i∈∪ts=1Es ∈ R∪
t
s=1E
s
of payments, where pti is a participating
bidder i’s payment to the seller delivered in period t (nonparticipants make zero payments).
A disclosure policy is a function H (“history”) on the set of nonterminal history nodes such
that, at each such node (dt−1, Et), H assigns to each period-t entrant i ∈ Et an information set
Hi(d
t−1, Et) that contains this node. A period-t entrant i’s knowledge consists of his realized value,
all the rules of the search mechanism, and the fact that he is at a node belonging to Hi(dt−1, Et).
A bidder makes the participation decision only after he has acquired this knowledge.
In a non-disclosure policy, for any entrant i ∈ Et,Hi(dt−1, Et) consists of all the nonterminal
history nodes (d0, E1, . . . , Es), with s = 1, 2, . . ., such that i ∈ Es (so i cannot tell any two of
these nodes apart); hence i does not even know which period he is in, let alone the past sequence
of entry or the reports from previous entrants. In a full disclosure policy, for any entrant i ∈ Et,
Hi(d
t−1, Et) = {(dt−1, Et)}; hence i knows the entire past history, including the reports from
previous entrants.
A revelation search mechanism is a triplet (σ, p,H), consisting of a search procedure σ, pay-
ment scheme p, and disclosure policy H . Note that since σ is a transition function, this definition
allows randomization of the sequence of search, payment scheme, and disclosure policy.
From the above definition we can derive the notations used in the main text. Let ω˜ be a
random vector with support Ω such that, conditional on any decision node dt ∈ D, any realization ω
of ω˜ uniquely determines an immediate successor s(ω) of dt, and the probability with which a
successor is s(ω) is equal to the probability governed by the transition function σ(dt). A realized
state x˜ is a pair of bidder-type profile and realization of ω˜:
x˜ := (x, ω) := ((xi)i∈I , ω) ∈ X × Ω.
If every invited bidder participates and is truthful, then any realized state x uniquely determines a
complete history of the search, i.e., a terminal node
(dτ , w) = (d0, E1, x1, . . . , Eτ , xτ , w),
where τ is the terminal period at which the mechanism ends, (E1, . . . , Eτ ) is the sequence of entry,
and w is the winner of the good (possibly the seller). Abusing notations, denote the terminal period
by τ(x˜), the good’s winner w(x˜), and the sequence of entry by (E1(x˜), . . . , Eτ(x˜)(x˜)). If bidder i
enters at period t during this search history, i’s information set is uniquely determined to be some
Hi(d
t−1(x˜), Et(x˜)); abusing notations, denote this t by ti(x˜), and this information set by Hi(x˜).
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Thus, given any revelation search mechanism (σ, p,H), if every invited bidder participates
and is truthful, then any realized state x˜ ∈ X × Ω uniquely determines the following objects:
Et(x˜) := the set of potential bidders who enter the mechanism in period t;
1i(x˜) := the indicator function for “player i finally owns the good”;
Hi(x˜) := the information set for bidder i when i enters;
ti(x˜) := the period at which player i enters the mechanism;
τ(x˜) := the period at which the search terminates.
All our calculations remain intact if these notations replace their counterparts (Et(x), qi(x), etc.) in
the main text. To keep the exposition simple, we prefer however to use in the main text the notations
introduced in Section 2.4. Moreover we assume in the main text that the search procedure is not
randomized; this assumption is harmless however because every player is risk neutral.
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